

Department of Defense

216.405-2

such contracts that are for environmental work only, provided the environmental work is not classified as construction, as defined by 10 U.S.C. 2801.

(2) The Secretary of Defense or designee must approve such contracts that are not for environmental work only or are for environmental work classified as construction.

[62 FR 1058, Jan. 8, 1997; 62 FR 1817, Jan. 13, 1997; 62 FR 49305, Sept. 19, 1997]

Subpart 216.4—Incentive Contracts

216.402 Application of predetermined, formula-type incentives.

216.402-2 Technical performance incentives.

Contractor performance incentives should relate to specific performance areas of milestones, such as delivery or test schedules, quality controls, maintenance requirements, and reliability standards.

216.403 Fixed-price incentive contracts.

(b) *Application.*

(3) Individual line items may have separate incentive provisions; e.g., when dissimilar work calls for separate formulas.

216.403-2 Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts.

(a) *Description.* (1)(iii) The formula does not apply for the life of the contract. It is used to fix the firm target profit for the contract. To provide an incentive consistent with the circumstances, the formula should reflect the relative risk involved in establishing an incentive arrangement where cost and pricing information were not sufficient to permit the negotiation of firm targets at the outset.

216.404 Fixed-price contracts with award fees.

Award-fee provisions may be used in fixed-price contracts as provided in 216.470

[63 FR 11529, Mar. 9, 1998]

216.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.

216.405-1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.

(b) *Application.*

(3) Give appropriate weight to basic acquisition objectives in negotiating the range of fee and the fee adjustment formula. For example—

(A) In an initial product development contract, it may be appropriate to provide for relatively small adjustments in fee tied to the cost incentive feature, but provide for significant adjustments if the contractor meets or surpasses performance targets.

(B) In subsequent development and test contracts, it may be appropriate to negotiate an incentive formula tied primarily to the contractor's success in controlling costs.

[56 FR 36340, July 31, 1991. Redesignated at 63 FR 11529, Mar. 9, 1998]

216.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.

(a) *Description.* (i) Normally, award fee is not earned when the fee-determining official has determined that contractor performance has been submarginal or unsatisfactory.

(ii) The basis for all award fee determinations shall be documented in the contract file.

(b) *Application.* (1) The cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract is also suitable for level of effort contracts where mission feasibility is established but measurement of achievement must be by subjective evaluation rather than objective measurement. See Table 16-1, Performance Evaluation Criteria, for sample performance evaluation criteria and Table 16-2, Contractor Performance Evaluation Report, for a sample evaluation report.

(2) The contracting activity may—

(A) Establish a board to—

(1) Evaluate the contractor's performance; and

(2) Determine the amount of the award or recommend an amount to the contracting officer.

(B) Afford the contractor an opportunity to present information on its own behalf.

(3) The CPAF contract may include provisional award fee payments. A provisional award fee payment is a payment made within an evaluation period prior to a final evaluation for that period. The contracting officer may include provisional award fee payments in a CPAF contract on a case-by-case basis, provided those payments—

(A) Are made no more frequently than monthly;

(B) Are limited to no more than—

(1) For the initial award fee evaluation period, 50 percent of the award fee available for that period; and

(2) For subsequent award fee evaluation periods, 80 percent of the evaluation score for the prior evaluation period times the award fee available for the current period, *e.g.*, if the contractor received 90 percent of the award fee available for the prior evaluation period, provisional payments for the current period shall not exceed 72 percent (90 percent \times 80 percent) of the award fee available for the current period;

(C) Are superseded by an interim or final award fee evaluation for the applicable evaluation period. If provisional payments have exceeded the payment determined by the evaluation score for the applicable period, the contracting officer shall collect the debt in accordance with FAR 32.606; and

(D) May be discontinued, or reduced in such amounts deemed appropriate by the contracting officer, when the contracting officer determines that the contractor will not achieve a level of performance commensurate with the provisional payment. The contracting officer shall notify the contractor in writing of any discontinuance or reduction in provisional award fee payments.

(c) *Limitations.* The CPAF contract shall not be used—

(i) To avoid—

(A) Establishing CPFF contracts when the criteria for CPFF contracts apply, or

(B) Developing objective targets so a CPIF contract can be used.

(ii) For either engineering development or operational system development acquisitions which have specifications suitable for simultaneous research and development and produc-

tion, except a CPAF contract may be used for individual engineering development or operational system development acquisitions ancillary to the development of a major weapon system or equipment, where—

(A) It is more advantageous; and

(B) The purpose of the acquisition is clearly to determine or solve specific problems associated with the major weapon system or equipment.

(2)(A) Do not apply the weighted guidelines method to CPAF contracts for either the base (fixed) fee or the award fee.

(B) The base fee shall not exceed three percent of the estimated cost of the contract exclusive of the fee.

[56 FR 36340, July 31, 1991. Redesignated at 63 FR 11529, Mar. 9, 1998; 68 FR 64568, Nov. 14, 2003]

216.470 Other applications of award fees.

The “award amount” portion of the fee may be used in other types of contracts under the following conditions:

(a) The Government wishes to motivate and reward a contractor for—

(1) Purchase and use of capital assets (including machine tools) manufactured in the United States, on major defense acquisition programs; or

(2) Management performance in areas which cannot be measured objectively and where normal incentive provisions cannot be used. For example, logistics support, quality, timeliness, ingenuity, and cost effectiveness are areas under the control of management which may be susceptible only to subjective measurement and evaluation.

(b) The “base fee” (fixed amount portion) is not used.

(c) The chief of the contracting office approves the use of the “award amount.”

(d) An award review board and procedures are established for conduct of the evaluation.

(e) The administrative costs of evaluation do not exceed the expected benefits.